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Introduction.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) implementing partners and Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs) are looked to by the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) for major reconstruction in Afghanistan. They are ineffective however, because security conditions keep them out of many areas. Because USAID implementing partners and NGOs ineffectively operate in a significant part of Afghanistan, ISAF must assume the lead in reconstruction in these areas. ISAF cannot afford to wait until the security environment improves to the point when USAID and NGOs can enter in full force to accomplish major reconstruction. Every lost day jeopardizes the support of the Afghan population for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).
The Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan has correctly identified the legitimacy of the GIRoA and the support of the population as the two key centers of gravity.
The development of any fledgling government requires an inordinate amount of time that often supports the insurgent vice counterinsurgent side of protracted warfare. The population, waiting for their government to provide them with a better way of life, find themselves disenchanted with the struggling government process. Consequently, they gravitate towards the insurgent who reinforces cultural/religious values and offers immediate security.
ISAF maintains the ability to operate anywhere in Afghanistan but lacks the technical expertise and resources to assume the lead for major reconstruction. With minor structural changes and outsourcing of expertise ISAF forces can create the capability to assume the reconstruction mission. This will help to maintain popular support and buy the time necessary for the GIRoA and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to mature. This paper will not discuss the broad application of COIN in Afghanistan. It will discuss how security impacts reconstruction and the correlation of reconstruction to security.
It will identify the major projects that need to be the focus of reconstruction, and the roles and responsibilities of the reconstruction players. It discusses why it is important to transform the environment beyond simple construction and how this has proven successful in increasing the security, economy, and popular support of the Afghan people. Finally, it concludes that ISAF must assume the lead role in reconstruction in the high threat areas.
Discussion / Analysis.
The current ISAF COIN strategy in Afghanistan is based on a "shape, clear, hold and build strategy." Military forces shape the conditions of the security environment, clear areas of insurgents, hold with the enduring presence of ANSF, and set the conditions to build through enabling the extension of viable governance and development. This strategy focuses on meeting the basic needs of the people."
2 During the build portion the aim is to transform the environment so that the insurgents no longer have the support of the population. This transformation is accomplished by establishing the GIRoA and ANSF in the area and using reconstruction to both meet the immediate and long term needs of the people.
3 Security Challenges.
Despite many positive developments in Afghanistan, security challenges adversely affect development in the areas of health, education, roads, power, and water. In the South and the Eastern areas the insurgents challenge the control of the GIRoA. The Pashtun tribe comprises the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan (see figure 2 ) and is the tribe that has shaped the governance of Afghanistan for over 200 years. They account for almost half of the Afghan population and have traditionally ruled the country. They formed the base of, and were predominate in, the ascension of the Taliban to power.
Especially important is the fact that the tribe does not recognize the existing Afghan-Pakistan border and continue to maintain and conduct cross border tribal affairs. The Pashtuns that live near the border find themselves caught between loyalty to the GIRoA and to their tribe. Daily pressures are exerted on them as they encounter Pashtun insurgents operating in these areas. By tribal code, called Pashtunwali, they are obligated to provide these insurgents with aid and comfort. 8 Additionally, the lure of Pakistan based
Madrassas to Afghan families is persuasive enough to continue the draw of Afghan youth as students. Pashtun families in Afghanistan are presented with the opportunity to send their sons to a fully sponsored Islamic school where they are fed, housed, and educated. The opportunity for a fully funded education is a compelling offer to a poor family. This recruitment sustains the fodder of young military men who are educated in the Pakistan Madrassas, recruited by militant insurgent groups, trained, and subsequently enter the insurgency as home grown fighters. Family ties to these returning youth support efforts on the side of the insurgency.
The economy and the Big Four reconstruction projects.
Afghanistan's economy continues to grow slowly but it is a growth mostly confined to the major urban areas. 9 According to ISAF Gross Domestic Product has doubled since 2003 and increased in 2007 by 13%. 10 Afghanistan, however, still remains dependent on foreign aid. 11 Food and fuel dominate requirements and prices, along with inflation, continue to rise. 12 Some of the key issues negatively impacting economic growth are: security, the lack of roads, power, water access for agriculture, and education. 13 These areas have become the focus of reconstruction efforts by the international community. 14 Because of their economic importance, roads, power, water access for agriculture, and education comprise the "Big Four" reconstruction projects.
Roads facilitate movement for trade, medical support, NGO activities, and link the rural areas to the urban areas. Ultimately they improve security. Weather severely impacts the majority of roads in Afghanistan because they are non-paved and generally follow stream beds in valley floors. Some key roads are impassable during the winter, spring and early fall due to snow and rain. When ISAF or international agencies improve (gravel improvement) existing roads their lifespan is generally 6-11 months or about one winter.
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The GIRoA, along with international contributors and ISAF have made road development a top priority and rely on civilian expertise and organizations to build paved roads. The lack of security has delayed some road projects and resulted in increased costs. The electrical power system in Afghanistan provides less than 10% of the population with intermittent power. 18 This system, archaic by any standard before the Soviet invasion, was almost completely destroyed after the Soviets withdrew during the subsequent civil war.
Power system reconstruction has been slow in development and the lack of a durable power system negatively affects the economic development of the country.
19
The development of a national power system takes time and should be designed to take advantage of internal capabilities with supplementation through regional initiatives.
Although progress continues towards leveraging regional power systems like power initiatives with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the development of internal capabilities remains Afghanistan has enormous potential in the field of agriculture and this sector accounts for almost 45% of the national GDP. The capability exists to transform this sector from a subsistence based economy to a regional exportation economy. The primary issue confronting agriculture capability is the lack of water. 21 Only about 30% of the country's available water resources are currently being used, and at low efficiency and productivity." 22 The majority of farmers are dependent on snow melt and rain fall to irrigate their farms. 23 Afghanistan has more than 5.7 million students in school. 24 Unfortunately, over half of Afghan children are still out of school. Of the 30,000 to 40,000 yearly high school graduates only about one-third enter college --the rest remain unemployed. 25 In the last seven years, more than 3,500 schools have been built but thousands of Afghan children still travel to Pakistan for madrassa based education. 26 According to the Afghan Minister of Education, Mr. Hanif Atmar, "In Pakistan there are around 15,000 madrassas, and around 1.5 million students enrolled there. If we invest adequately, and according to the policy of the government, in our madrassas system, to a large extent those Afghans who are now being taught in madrassas across the border will come back to their own country." 27 Afghan parents are sending their sons to the Pakistani madrassas because they offer fully funded religious training. 28 Afghan President Karzai recently announced that the building of Afghan based madrassas, to combat the Pakistan based system, is a top priority for the Afghan government.
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Roles and Responsibilities of the key reconstruction players.
The GIRoA is finally taking the responsibility to plan and coordinate the economic USAID works to create economic growth, governance, and to eliminate the conditions that produce extremism. 33 USAID field officers monitor reconstruction and development efforts and implement PRT-specific programming. 34 They have made road construction and irrigation improvements the priority effort. USAID accomplishes their reconstruction projects through the use of implementing partners. These civilian organizations provide the expertise needed to plan, coordinate, and build each project.
Implementing partner's rely on local Afghan police forces to provide the security required for their construction area. Occasionally they are allowed to hire local civilian security forces. These security forces maintain the capability to operate in low threat areas but are not robust enough to provide security in the high threat areas.
"Vital to the success or failure" of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan "will be the role played by the major implementing partners of the UN and of major donors who will actually implement projects in the field -the NGOs." 35 Funded by the UN, governments or by privately raised resources, NGOs have played an important role in development in
Afghanistan. 36 NGOs are involved in a multitude of efforts including secondary road construction, agricultural, health, and education programs. 37 In Afghanistan NGO freedom of movement is limited due to the security situation (see figure 1 on page 3).
Personal experience.
I served from January 2006 to May 2007 as a Task Force Commander in Paktika
Province, Afghanistan. 38 I had the opportunity to employ our COIN strategy and firmly believe it is a strategy that will ultimately be successful. Even though we became involved in a significant surge of kinetic activity our command briefing catch phrase emphasized the importance of reconstruction on the COIN fight: "Projects are our best weapon system."
There was no doubt that we could separate the enemy from the population but the most important aspect was to maintain that separation, support the establishment of the GIRoA and ANSF into the area, and then to transform the environment through reconstruction.
Clearly understood in our COIN strategy is that there is no military solution. We saw the effects projects had within the province both in terms of security and increased support from the population. Especially important was the effect -just knowing they were going to get a project had desired effects as it reinforced the "hope in the future" aspect. We had the ability to infuse the province with numerous quick impact projects along the lines of clinics, irrigation, schools, governance centers, mosque refurbishment, and humanitarian assistance.
Prior to our tour (pre 2006) $6.5 million had been spent on quick impact projects and humanitarian assistance. Through our 16 month tour in conjunction with the PRT (and very limited USAID support), 39 we spent or obligated monies totaling over $90 million. Of these funds, $18 million was obligated for the first paved road that would link the capital of Sharona to the major economic village of Orgune. 40 What we lacked was the ability to plan, contract, and construct province wide paved roads, power systems, reservoirs, canals, and large schools that would compete with the Pakistan madrassas.
A great frustration was with the lack of long term reconstruction planning and our ability to attract the major reconstruction projects that would ultimately transform the province. Because of the perceived security situation in the province USAID could not contract the civilian implementing partners needed to complete major reconstruction. We did have some NGO activity that was confined to small projects but they refused to commit to major reconstruction along the lines of the Big Four.
My experience with the improvement and construction of the road systems was that roads not only caused a significant increase in the economy but also measurably increased the security in the area. Roads were a topic of discussion in every shura meeting my commanders and I held. These were gravel improved roads that used the existing primitive road network, normally along a stream bed, and were constructed by the U.S. combat engineer task force.
Even smaller road based projects focused at village business centers had significant economic impacts. In these cases we would construct cobblestone roads through the village bazaar area, hiring local workers to complete the project, and complimenting them with ten year maintenance free solar street lights. This infused monies into the local economy, improved the capacity of the bazaar area, and the solar street lights lengthened the business day past sundown. These were hugely successful and resulted in enormous economic growth.
In the fall of 2006, as several of the roads began to deteriorate, I was repeatedly asked why we weren't building paved roads. To be effective these paved roads needed to be built into the high ground out of the flood range -which was certainly outside the organic capability of our US combat engineers. In meetings with tribal elders along the Pakistan border, the trafficability of the interior Afghan roads was even more important. They confided to me that is was easier to go to Pakistan for medical aid and business because the road system was better and they could get there and back to their homes quicker. Clearly this was an indicator that the "transformed" environment still remained on the Pakistan side of the border. In my 16 months in rural Afghanistan, roads were the number one requested project followed by irrigation, power, and education.
Paktika province and the majority of Afghanistan are agricultural based societies.
Farming is subsistence based designed to bring the food to the table or to the village bazaar.
Afghanistan's hope for the future partly lies in its ability to transform from a family based agricultural system to a system that could export agricultural products to neighboring countries. What I observed was that wherever the Afghan's could move water they could grow a crop of their choosing. The challenge was in their ability to move the water from existing streams and rivers to the land they wished to cultivate. Agricultural productivity is totally dependent on annual snow and rain fall -they have no reservoir/canal system that can store and transport water. Drought and the lack of a formal irrigation system significantly impacted the growing season and productivity.
Power generation was completely confined to fuel based generators. Even the provincial capital city of Sharona lacked power generation outside of personally owned generators. With no plan to establish a link to a power grid or to build hydro electric or wind/solar based power systems the province is way behind in obtaining this capability.
Lethal operations were predominately confined to the border area. As we developed our intelligence from captured insurgents and material we identified that the majority of the low level fighters were provided from a series of Pakistani based madrassas. Afghan leaders confided that the insurgents were recruiting their sons into the Pakistan madrassas with the offer of a fully funded education (room and board). This was extremely inviting to any Afghan family as it provided a golden opportunity to get their son a free education. In addition, what was often promised was the opportunity for the son to remain in Pakistan and be employed in the local economy where they could earn a significantly larger income and could then supplement the family income. The dilemma we faced was how to stop the sons of Afghanistan from continuing to be drawn into the insurgency in the madrassas in Pakistan.
During discussions with the Paktika Governor we determined that the best method to combat 
Conclusions.
Although reconstruction efforts are only a piece of the COIN strategy in Afghanistan, they are absolutely critical. After seven years of Coalition military, USAID, and NGO efforts the country has been saturated with schools, clinics, wells, district centers, and other quick impact projects that no longer meet the needs of the people. Only major reconstruction, along the lines of the Big Four projects, can serve to give hope to the people for a better future.
The majority of the major reconstruction to date has been implemented in permissive areas, predominately urban areas, at expense to the rural population. This rural population is dominated by the Pashtun tribe, the largest tribe in Afghanistan. The Pashtun's have played a major role in governance throughout the history of Afghanistan and the tribe occupies a majority of the sanctuary area of Pakistan. As long as this sanctuary exists in support of the insurgents they will maintain the ability to recruit, train, organize, and launch attacks into 
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Since ISAF has a limited ability to directly affect the sanctuary areas in Pakistan they must transform the border areas through reconstruction. This combined with the extension and legitimatization of the GIRoA and ANSF into the areas will improve security. The insurgents will encounter a transformed environment that no longer provides them resources and support. In a recent survey conducted by the Asia Foundation, Afghan's responded that 'Rebuilding of the country' was the most important indicator that their country was headed in the right direction. 47 The Afghan National Development Strategy has integrated the provincial plans into one National Plan for the development of the country. Unfortunately, a single individual or agency has not been tasked to coordinate and implement this plan. This makes the prioritization of resources and efforts across multiple international agencies impossible.
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ISAF is at a point in time where small impact projects have reached their potential.
ISAF needs to increase efforts in the building of the Big Four projects that will lead to security, economic prosperity and long term stability. The Big Four projects require centralized planning, prioritization, and effective implementation to be successful. In support of ISAF COIN efforts these projects must focus on the areas where the insurgency still enjoys the freedom to operate. These are the high risk areas where USAID implementing partners and NGOs are not able to operate effectively.
Recommendations.
ISAF cannot afford to wait for the security situation to improve enough to support USAID implementing partners and NGO reconstruction in the high threat areas. These areas are dominated by the Pashtun tribe and it is absolutely critical to have them supporting the GIRoA. ISAF should begin the construction of Big Four projects in the high threat areas. A formal reconstruction organization needs to be created that includes representatives from all of the key reconstruction players previously discussed. This organization should have the ability to assign reconstruction projects based on the security conditions in each area.
Additionally, this organization should have the authority to approve project nominations, obligate monies, and supervise project construction.
ISAF should transform the road network in Afghanistan from one that is urban focused, weather dependant, and isolated, to a paved system that opens the provinces to internal and external trade. 49 Dams, reservoirs and canals need to be built to combine the use of hydro electric power with agricultural irrigation. Hydro electric power systems should combine with wind/solar and natural gas power as quick sustainable systems focused in both major and rural economic areas. Agricultural conditions need to be transformed from a subsistence based economy to a regional exportation economy. Afghanistan needs an irrigation system built in rural farming areas consisting of irrigation ponds and reservoirs that are supported by a system of lined canals. This will allow the Afghan's to build their water capacity and free them from the current dependence of annual snow melt and rain fall. ISAF needs to build schools in Afghanistan that compete with the Pakistan madrassas. These need to be fully funded, religious based, and offer follow on progression to job markets and college programs. capabilities that will create a more effective unity of effort. Of critical importance is the need for this organization to have the authority to "cauterize" the reconstruction system with ultimate oversight on the Afghan National Development Strategy.
ISAF should request an increase to the force level in Afghanistan to address reconstruction in the high threat areas. Dedicating ISAF forces for reconstruction security to protect civilian construction organizations and augmenting combat engineer units with the civilian expertise that will allow them to construct Big Four projects. In addition to combat maneuver forces ISAF should leverage the various NATO forces for their ability to provide engineer units that can contribute to the reconstruction efforts in the high threat areas.
PRTs and ISAF military forces need to continue to maintain the ability to meet the population's basic needs through quick impact projects and humanitarian assistance. The PRT must remain the central organization and a tool for the Afghan Governors' for coordinating and supervising the provincial development plan. They should remain under the control of the respective Regional Command yet have the support of the Reconstruction Czar for the execution of province reconstruction plans.
ISAF needs to operate alongside the GIRoA at every level to develop their capacity to fully assume the command, control, and supervision of reconstruction. This must include both formal and informal education at all levels. Reconstruction needs to be complimented by a system of command, control, and execution that meets the needs requested by the GIRoA and allows them to take credit for the project. This will support their legitimization in the eyes of the people.
A program of national employment, similar to the US Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), needs to be started to employ Afghans on the Big Four construction programs. This will reduce unemployment, put money into the hands of Afghans, and teach skill and trade
craft.
An aggressive Information campaign needs to compliment the reconstruction efforts especially in the high threat areas. This should be executed through province and district shuras, radio broadcasts, and national level media that reaches cross border to the sanctuary areas. Much is gained by just informing the tribal elders of the reconstruction plan and gaining their input and support. Knowing what their tribal area stands to gain and that they have input in the development is absolutely critical in gaining and maintaining their support.
ISAF needs to acknowledge the importance of the Pashtun tribe on the history of control in Afghanistan and its link to the insurgent sanctuary area in Pakistan. They cannot afford to continue a path of trying to gain security first to create the conditions that will allow USAID and NGOs to operate in the high threat areas. As long as the sanctuary remains the security will never reach the point to support civilian reconstruction.
The US Military needs to review the current COIN doctrine and address the issue of reconstruction in an environment where civilian organizations either will not or can't operate.
Such an environment requires military capability to operate but often exceeds the military's technical ability to conduct major reconstruction. A need exists for an organization along the lines of the US Corps of Engineers. This organization can leverage civilian expertise and technology while maintaining the ability to operate in a high threat area.
Final Remarks.
USAID and NGOs will argue that ISAF should not assume their role but focus on establishing the security necessary for them to operate. This paper does not advocate that ISAF should, in total, assume the role of USAID and NGOs. It proposes that ISAF should focus them into the areas they can operate and assume their roles and responsibilities in the areas that the security prevents them from operating. Major reconstruction projects focused at the Big Four will ultimately transform the environment and deny the enemy the support of the population. As security improves through this transformation, the conditions will then allow USAID implementing partners and NGOs to enter and operate effectively. 15. The Sharona to Orgune road was completed just prior to my unit assuming control in Paktika Province. Once built, this reduced travel time from 12 hours to 4 and increased the economic output along the road an estimated 300% in 10 months. The problem with the road was the US Engineer Task Force improved the road for the most part as it existed near a major stream. Low water crossings were constructed and the gravel improved road was moved out of the stream bed in some sections but not all of them. I routinely drove the road to and from our FOB to meet with the Governor and PRT commander in Sharona. As such, I personally witnessed the impact the road initially had to the local economy and the degradation of the road over time due to weather. This road was a point of reference that many of the tribal elders brought up to me in requesting a similar road within their tribal and village areas. As far as security was concerned, this road was such a source of economic vitality that it became the safest road in the Province with only 2 IEDs in 16 months and zero direct attacks. Our assessment was this improvement to security was caused by tribal influence over insurgent activity (covertly) and most likely the roads economic vitality was recognized by the insurgents as an area that they didn't want to cause a point of friction with the population. 39. USAID was a complete disappointment for me in Afghanistan. We operated without a USAID representative for 10 out of the 16 months we were there. This was actually better then past OEF rotations as USAID did not provide a permanent representative to Paktika until late into our rotation, fall of 2006. Although our USAID representative was exceptional (I would say he was the best in Afghanistan) he struggled with securing implementing partners and AID monies for Paktika due to the UNAMA security classification of the Province which defined Paktika as a high or extreme risk area. The impact of all of this activity on the local economy was significant. Contracts required the hiring of people from the area. As of May 2007-There were $68.9 Million Dollars worth of projects on going or about to begin in Paktika. A major portion of these were gravel improved cross-country roads but includes the Sharona-Orgune paved road ($18.5M) that we succeeded in securing monies for during the spring of 2007. The serious CMO effort in Paktika started under 1-508 th in OEFVI. Most of the numbers in the Pre-'06 column can be attributed directly to them. They emphasized the importance of the CMO effort in the AO and my battalion continued it aggressively in the OEFVII-VIII timeframe. The Sharona PRT also became a major contributor during this time and coordination between the maneuver units and the PRT was tremendously successful. 41. This is my opinion but based on the historical influence that the Pashtun's have had on the governance of Afghanistan. The Pashtun tribal influence extends into the ungoverned Federal Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan and as I discuss in the body of the paper this is the key sanctuary area for the insurgency that enjoys support through the Pashtun tribe in certain areas of Afghanistan. To win in Afghanistan we must have the popular support of the Pashtun tribe among all others as they have the largest population base, control the FATA, and maintain the capability to sustain the insurgency. 
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